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Introduction 
In Dome Telecom v. Eircom1 the Irish Supreme Court has
given guidance on the power of the courts in relation to
electronic discovery and in particular whether the courts
may require a party to extract, collate and analyse
records from a database and to produce a report
containing that information.
Factual background
The plaintiff Dome Telecom was in the business of
selling call cards to consumers, which enabled them to
make cheap telephone calls from any handset
(including mobiles and payphones) by first calling a
1800 freephone number. Calls made to this 1800
number would pass over the network of the defendant
Eircom, the incumbent telecommunications company
and former monopoly that still enjoyed a dominant
market share and control of most of the infrastructure.
From May 2000 onwards, Eircom imposed a
telecommunications interconnection charge (transit
charge) on certain operators in Ireland for calls to
freephone (1800) numbers originating from mobile
handsets and payphones, a charge that was ultimately
borne by the plaintiff and its customers. Dome Telecom
alleged, however, that Eircom had imposed this transit
charge in a discriminatory manner. In particular, they
claimed that Eircom had failed to impose the charge on
international operators, so that international providers
of call cards enjoyed an overwhelming competitive
advantage over domestic providers such as the plaintiff.
Consequently they brought proceedings in the High
Court alleging that Eircom had acted in breach of,
amongst other things, sections 4 and 5 of the
Competition Act 1991 and Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty of Rome.
Discovery sought
In support of these proceedings, Dome Telecom looked
for discovery under twelve different categories.
Ultimately, however, the question to be determined by
the court was reduced to whether they were entitled to
discovery under Category 9, under which they sought:2
‘All documents relating to the 1800 numbers issued
by the defendant to licensed operators and/or
international carriers and/or other entities from 1 July
2000 to the date hereof to include any and all
schedules, lists or database setting out the quantity
of 1800 numbers issued per month, the entity to
whom they were issued, and the volume of minutes
trafficked per month in respect of each 1800 number
issued by reference to access method’.
The plaintiff justified this request by submitting that this
was necessary to show that international call card
operators had benefited from the discriminatory pricing
at its expense:
‘Simply put, the explanation of the reasons for
seeking this Category 9 … was that the plaintiff
believes that its competitor call card operators, on
whom the defendant did not levy the two charges at
issue, experienced a huge growth in volumes of
minutes over the period of the discriminatory
charging. This would be evidenced if the plaintiff can
identify the volumes of minutes to each 1800 number
used as a method of access on those competing call
cards … [T]his evidence of volumes of minutes per
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ARTICLE:
1800 number would not only show the level of
discriminatory charging, but would greatly inform any
analysis of the plaintiff’s losses as a result of the
defendant’s discrimination…’
The defendant, however, challenged both the utility and
proportionality of this request, and submitted that it
went beyond discovery of existing documents and
would impose an impermissible obligation to engage in
data mining so as to create entirely new documents:3
‘There are, in effect, no ‘schedules, lists or database
setting out’ the requested information. Rather, our
client has an extremely complex computerised billing
system that electronically generates a CDR [call data
record] for every call made, 24 hours a day, seven
days a week across its entire network. Second, if
CDRs for all traffic to freephone numbers were to be
produced … every CDR produced by the defendant for
each call made during the entire 66 month-period
would have to be extracted. To do this, our client’s
technical personnel have indicated it would be
necessary to restore each month in turn to a shadow
database … following which data analysis would have
to be run on the extracted records in order to identify
the freephone traffic and separate it from non-
freephone traffic, as only the former would be
discoverable and the defendant would plainly be in
breach of its obligation of confidentiality to its clients
if it were to provide all the estimated 29,700 million
CDRs in question to the plaintiff. Our technical
personnel estimate that it would take one person
working fulltime for six to eight months in order to
complete this exercise.’
Instead, to avoid any need for this discovery, the
defendant was willing to concede that all of the increase
in mobile traffic to 1800 numbers and up to 50 per cent
of the increase in fixed line traffic to 1800 numbers was
to the benefit of international call card operators.
Notwithstanding this concession, the trial judge,
McKechnie J, held that discovery of this information was
necessary and proportionate for the purposes of the
action. As regards Eircom’s argument that this involved
the creation of a new document, the trial judge held that
the use of existing raw data in this way was still within
the scope of Order 31 rule 12 of the Rules of the
Superior Courts governing discovery, and if it did go
beyond those rules, then such an extension was
merited. The trial judge therefore ordered the defendant
to make discovery of:4
‘The volume of minutes trafficked per month from
31st day of August 1999 to 23rd day of December
2003 in respect of each 1800 number by reference to
access method by the defendant to international
carriers and/or other entities (to be limited for the
time being to those identified and set forth in the
schedule hereto) where the volume of minutes
trafficked to that international carrier and/or other
entity in any given month exceeded 5,000 minutes –
the documents within the power of the defendant to
be created from the defendant’s raw data and
databases and using the defendant’s own database.’
Eircom appealed this order to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the power of the High Court to order
discovery did not extend to requiring a party to create
new documents for the purpose of proceedings where
those documents did not already exist at the time the
order was made, and that in any event the extent of the
order was disproportionate in light of its concessions.
The Supreme Court decision
On appeal, the majority of the Supreme Court (Fennelly
and Kearns JJ, Geoghegan J dissenting) held that the
unusual burden and heavy cost of the discovery sought
in this case, in light of the discovery already had and the
concessions made by the defendant, meant that the
order sought was unnecessary and disproportionate at
this stage of the proceedings. (The majority did hold
that the plaintiff could renew the application once
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liability had been determined if at that stage it was
necessary for the assessment of damages.)
However, two members of the court (Fennelly and
Geoghegan JJ, Kearns J reserving his position) went on to
consider whether in principle such an order could be
made. In doing so they had to interpret Order 31 rule 12 of
the Rules of the Superior Courts which governs discovery
in Ireland and which provides, so far as relevant, that:
‘Any party may apply to the Court by way of notice of
motion for an order directing any other party to any
cause or matter to make discovery on oath of the
documents which are or have been in his or her
possession or power, relating to any matter in question
therein.’
While the term ‘document’ is not defined in the Rules of
the Superior Courts, there had been little doubt but that it
includes computer records5 and the Supreme Court
confirmed this with Geoghegan J expressing his approval
of the judgment of Vinelott J in Derby v Weldon (No. 9)6
where the English High Court held that a database held
on computer in so far as it contained information capable
of being retrieved and converted into readable form (and
whether stored in the computer itself or recorded in
backup files) was a ‘document’.
Of more difficulty, however, was the well established
rule in Irish law that a court will only order discovery of
existing documents and will not require documents to be
created for the purposes of discovery.7 While both
Fennelly and Geoghegan JJ held that this rule did not
prevent the making of the order in the present case, they
differed somewhat as to the reason why.  Fennelly J held
simply that what was involved was not the creation of a
new record but simply the presentation in a particular
format of existing records which could be covered by
‘adapting’ the rules of court:
‘It is, of course, axiomatic that a court will only order
discovery of documents or records which exist. If no
record has been made of a relevant conversation,
meeting or event, a court will not, for the purpose of
discovery, require a party to make one.
That is not what is required by the High Court order in
this case. Undoubtedly, the order obliges the Appellant
to take very elaborate, complex and costly steps in
order to make information available in a form in which
it has not previously existed. But the call data records
(CDR’s) exist and are capable of being retrieved. The
order is not equivalent to requiring a party to make a
record, where one has never existed.
The rules of court have not been adapted so as to
make their objectives conformable to modern
technology. The courts have, nonetheless, been astute
to ensure that genuine discovery can be ordered even
when advances in technology have the effect that
discovery takes a very different form from that of
documents as traditionally understood. In former
times, there would have been a written record of every
commercial transaction. Old methods of record-
keeping could not have coped with the sheer volume
of traffic generated by the new means of
communications. I accept that failure by the courts to
move with the times by adapting the rules to new
technology might encourage unscrupulous businesses
to keep their records in a form which would defeat the
ends of justice. I would, therefore, like Geoghegan J
reject this ground of appeal.’
Geoghegan J, on the other hand, took a somewhat
broader view, holding at the outset that the court had an
inherent power to govern its own procedures, even
entirely outside the rules of court, where necessary to
ensure a fair trial of the action:
‘My starting point would be that I would reject any
idea that the right to discovery of documents should
be exclusively based on an interpretation (literal or
otherwise) of the relevant rule of court. According to
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed. Vol. 13 para. 1
footnote 3, the discovery of documents “was originally
an equitable device employed in the Court of Chancery
for obtaining the disclosure and inspection of relevant
documents as well as the disclosure and admissions of
relevant facts.” It had a more limited history in the
common law courts but from and after the Judicature
Act, the chancery practice applied in all courts though
of course ever since the Judicature Act, there has been
a rule of court regulating discovery. In modern times,
courts are not necessarily hidebound by interpretation
5 See D. Kelleher and K. Murray, Information
Technology Law in Ireland (2nd edn., Tottel, 2007,
Dublin) at 794 and McCarthy v O’Flynn [1979] IR
127 where the Supreme Court accepted that an X-
Ray film was a ‘document’ within the meaning of
the rules on discovery on the basis that, per Kenny
J, ‘The main characteristic of a document is that it
is something which gives information’. This
decision was applied in Clifford v Minister for
Justice  [2005] IEHC 288 by Budd J to hold that
‘The McCarthy case point concerned the inclusion
of x-ray plates or photographs and as they gave
information they were regarded as a document and
so tape recordings and compact discs and material
on computer are now encompassed as containing
information which, if relevant to the issues, is to be
considered for discovery.’
6 [1991] 1 WLR 652.
7 For instance, see Popovici and another v Nicholson
and others [2006] IEHC 152 where de Valera J notes
that ‘It seems appropriate to point out at this point
that only statistics already compiled and available
are discoverable – the discovery procedure is not
appropriate to seek to force the respondents to
compile statistics from information in their
possession for the benefit of the applicant.’
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of a particular rule of court. More general concepts of
ensuring fair procedures and efficient case
management are frequently overriding considerations.
The Rules of Court are important and adherence to
them is important but if an obvious problem of fair
procedures or efficient case management arises in
proceedings, the court, if there is no rule in existence
precisely covering the situation, has an inherent power
to fashion its own procedure and even if there was a
rule applicable, the court is not necessarily hidebound
by it.’
On that basis Geoghegan J went on to hold that fair
procedures required that the court have the power to
make an order such as the one in the present case, and
that the traditional rule against ordering a party to ‘create
documents’ was not appropriate to deal with the retrieval
of information from an electronic database:
‘It is common knowledge that a vast amount of stored
information in the business world which formerly
would have been in a documentary form in the
traditional sense is now computerised. As a matter of
fairness and common sense the courts must adapt
themselves to this situation and fashion appropriate
analogous orders of discovery. In order to achieve a
reasonable parity with traditional documentary
discovery it may well be necessary to direct a party “to
create documents” within the meaning of the notice of
appeal. It may indeed also be necessary to direct a
party “to create documents” within the meaning of the
notice of appeal even if such “documents” “do not
exist at the time the order is made”. I am deliberately
using quotation marks because I do not intend to
adjudicate on the quasi-metaphysical argument of Mr.
Paul Anthony McDermott, counsel for the respondent,
that the “documents” do in fact “exist”. At any rate
that matter can probably be argued both ways but I
would be firmly of opinion that an order of discovery
can be made which involves the creation of documents
which do not exist, made in the kind of context in
which it is sought in this case. Otherwise, potential
litigants could operate their business computers in
such a way that they would be able to evade any
worthwhile discovery. In expressing the above views, I
accept that superficially I am perhaps going a step
further than the English authorities have done in so far
as their rule of court can apparently be interpreted to
cover computer discovery. I have no hesitation,
however, in making that extension.’
Having said that, however, Geoghegan J went on to state
that ‘the court’s discretion in ordering discovery of
matters buried in a computer should be directed towards
confining the information obtained as far as possible to
what should reasonably have been available under
traditional documentary storage’. He also indicated that
the discretion enjoyed by the court to order this type of
discovery would have to be exercised in a way which
would take into account the factors mentioned in Derby v
Weldon (No. 9)8 in relation to inspection, so that the
discretion:
‘would not be exercised so as to give an unrestrictive
access to another party’s computer and … would be
ordered only to the extent that the parties seeking it
could satisfy the court that it was necessary for
disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving
costs, in the light of any evidence as to what
information could be made available, how far
inspection or copying of the database was necessary
or whether the provision of printouts would suffice and
what safeguards were required to avoid damage to the
database and minimise interference with its everyday
use.’
Comment
This case is not the first time that the Irish courts have
addressed discovery of this sort – that honour appears to
belong to the 2006 decision of the High Court in Used Car
Importers of Ireland Ltd. v Minister for Finance9 where
Laffoy J ordered the defendant to analyse their computer
records to reconstruct car depreciation data which was
relevant to the plaintiff’s claim. It is, however, the first
time that this issue has been considered by the Supreme
Court, and is the first case to consider the basis for the
court’s power to make such an order. The decision is
notable, therefore, for the willingness of the majority of
the court to fashion a new and expansive form of
discovery without any express basis in the Rules of the
Superior Courts and one which on the face of it departs
from the long standing rule that a court will only order
discovery of documents or records which already exist.
© TJ McIntyre, 2008
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